The proposed model determines the allocation of security forces in response to terrorist events with a series of coordinated attacks such as the Paris terror attacks in 2015. Two games are constructed, representing the two stages needed for the rapid deployment of security forces. The first stage applies a firearms assault game to analyze the interaction behaviors between the response agent (or security force commander) and the attackers in each response district. The terrorist threat value (TV) during a firearms assault event can then be derived from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The TVs are input to the second stage for computing the Shapley value for each event, in terms of the majority of TVs of all firearms assaults. The Shapley values are then used to create a set for reallocation of the limited security forces to respond to the multiple firearms assaults. The experimental results show the proposed division to fairer than the proportional division for allocating security forces.

所提出的模型通过一系列协同攻击（例如2015年的巴黎恐怖袭击）确定了应对恐怖事件的安全部队的分配。构建了两个游戏，代表了快速部署安全部队所需的两个阶段。第一阶段应用枪支攻击游戏，分析每个响应区域中响应代理（或安全部队指挥官）与攻击者之间的交互行为。然后可以从混合策略纳什均衡中得出枪支袭击事件中的恐怖威胁价值（TV）。根据所有枪支攻击的大多数电视，电视被输入到第二阶段以计算每个事件的Shapley值。然后，将Shapley值用于创建一个集合，以重新分配有限的安全部队，以应对多次枪支袭击。实验结果表明，与分配安全部队的比例划分相比，拟议划分更为公平。