This article examines the relationship between teachers’ unions and teacher turnover in U.S. public schools. The trade‐off between teacher pay and employment predicts that unions raise the dismissal rate of underperforming teachers but reduce the attrition of high‐quality teachers, as the higher wages unions negotiate provide districts strong incentives to scrutinize teacher performance during a probationary period while encouraging high‐quality teachers to remain in teaching. Using the district–teacher matched data and a natural experiment, I find that, compared to less‐unionized districts, highly unionized districts dismiss more low‐quality teachers and retain more high‐quality teachers, raising average teacher quality and educational outcomes.

中文翻译：

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工会过度保护不良教师的神话：来自地区与教师的教师流失匹配数据的证据

本文研究了美国公立学校教师工会与教师流动之间的关系。在教师薪酬和就业之间的权衡取舍表明，工会会提高表现不佳的教师的解雇率，但会降低高素质教师的流失率，因为工会所谈判的较高工资为各地区提供了强有力的激励机制，以在试用期内审查教师的表现，同时鼓励高薪。优质的教师留在教学中。通过使用地区教师匹配的数据和自然实验，我发现，与工会组织较少的地区相比，高度工会化的地区可以解雇更多的低素质教师，而保留更多的高质量教师，从而提高了平均教师素质和教育成果。