Thomas F. Gieryn's Truth‐Spots: How Places Make Us Believe presents eight case studies to support his historical‐sociological thesis that “Places … have agency and exert a force of their own on the direction and pace of knowledge and belief” (18). Gieryn adds a new angle to a century‐old discourse on the social construction of truth: the emplacement of credibility in narrated material locations. Throughout his career, Gieryn has contributed extensively to the spatial and placeful analysis of knowledge and social power: from advancing the concept of discursive “boundary‐work” in the 1980s, to a refined method of “cultural cartography” in the 1990s, and in the twenty‐first century, toward investigations of places: defined as meaning‐enriched material locations. He has now advanced “truth‐spots” as a type of place that credibilizes truth‐claims. This essay reviews the key concepts in the career of this historical sociologist of scientific knowledge, through a mapping of Gieryn's own trajectory within the arc of a long pragmatist tradition in US social science. I shall use Gieryn's own case studies to test two key claims in his account of how place operates in the social‐cultural construction of belief: (1) The model of “place” that Gieryn proposed in 2000, and has used consistently ever since (termed here a “Gieryn‐place”), and (2) Gieryn's claim that features of “truth‐spots” exhibit an observably independent (“agentic”) effect on the credibility of claims made there. I argue that both Gieryn‐places and truth‐spots suffer from incomplete specification of the ways in which people attach meanings to locations; of the boundaries of places; and of the sites of conscious encounter with places. They suffer also from his own boundary‐work to exclude imaginary, cultural, and virtual spaces from his conception of place. This essay argues that a credible account of how place operates in/as history will require a focus on situation and situatedness, drawing on the pragmatist tradition of the Thomas Theorem. The concept of situation completes the circuit between meaning‐production and the attachment of meaning to places and opens a gate for historical investigation, across the boundary between imagined, virtual, and conceptual spaces, and lived, material embodied places.

中文翻译：

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的边界，位置和状态

托马斯·吉林（Thomas F. Gieryn）的真相：地点如何使我们相信提出了八个案例研究来支持他的历史社会学论点，即“场所……具有代理能力，并在知识和信仰的方向和步伐上发挥着自己的力量”（18）。吉林（Gieryn）为百年历史关于真理的社会建构的论述增添了新的视角：将信誉置于叙述性物质场所。Gieryn在整个职业生涯中，为知识和社会力量的空间和位置分析做出了广泛的贡献：从1980年代提倡话语“边界工作”的概念，到1990年代提炼的“文化制图”方法，以及二十一世纪，是对地点的调查：定义为意义丰富的物质地点。他现在已经将“真相”作为一种破坏真相主张的场所。本文通过在美国社会科学一个长期的实用主义传统的弧线中描绘了吉林的轨迹，回顾了这位历史科学知识社会学家的职业生涯中的关键概念。我将使用Gieryn自己的案例研究来检验他关于场所在信仰的社会文化建构中如何运作的两个关键主张：（1）Gieryn在2000年提出的“场所”模型，此后一直使用（ （2）Gieryn的主张，“真相”的特征对在那里提出的主张的信誉表现出明显的独立（“代理”）效应。我认为Gieryn地点和真相地点都遭受人们对地点附加意义的方式的不完整说明。地方边界；和有意识地与地方相遇的地点。他们也遭受他自己的边界工作的困扰，从而将虚构的，文化的和虚拟的空间排除在他的位置概念之外。本文认为，要想对地方在历史中的运作方式进行可靠的描述，就需要借鉴托马斯定理的实用主义传统，着重于处境和环境。情境的概念完善了意义产生和意义与场所之间的联系，并打开了历史考察的大门，跨越了想象的，虚拟的和概念的边界 借鉴了托马斯定理的实用主义传统。情境的概念完善了意义产生和意义与场所之间的联系，并打开了历史考察的大门，跨越了想象的，虚拟的和概念的边界 借鉴了托马斯定理的实用主义传统。情境的概念完善了意义产生和意义与场所之间的联系，并打开了历史考察的大门，跨越了想象的，虚拟的和概念的边界空间和生活的物质体现的地方。