Are levels of criminal violence lower where emigrants collaborate with the state authorities in the funding and provision of public goods and services? In this article, I examine the causal effect on violence levels in the municipalities participating in Mexico's Three‐for‐One (3×1) Programme for Migrants. Using municipal‐level data for the period between 2001 and 2010, the analysis shows that the implementation of this programme led to an increase in violence in the municipalities in question, and that this effect is driven by the ‘war on drugs’ initiated by the Mexican government in 2006. Because cartels splinter when kingpins are captured, they look for sources of revenue other than drug smuggling. The budgetary gains obtained via the 3×1 Programme inadvertently increased the returns of extortion and directed the attention of organized criminals to the participant municipalities. The evidence highlights some of the unintended effects that the leveraging of emigrants' money may have in home countries where governments make the so‐called ‘kingpin strategy’ a centrepiece of their security strategy.

中文翻译：

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墨西哥的3×1计划与刑事暴力

在移民与州政府合作筹集和提供公共物品及服务时，刑事暴力的程度是否降低？在本文中，我研究了参加墨西哥“三对一（3×1）移民计划”的城市中暴力程度的因果关系。使用2001年至2010年期间的市级数据，分析表明，该计划的实施导致相关市镇的暴力行为增加，而这种影响是由毒品和犯罪问题办公室发起的“毒品战争”驱动的墨西哥政府于2006年采取行动。由于卡特尔在被抓获主销时会分裂，因此他们在寻找毒品走私以外的收入来源。通过3×1计划获得的预算收益无意中增加了敲诈勒索的收益，并将有组织犯罪分子的注意力吸引到了参与的市政当局。证据突显了利用移民资金可能在母国造成的一些意想不到的影响，在这些国家中，政府将所谓的“关键战略”作为其安全战略的核心。