This paper provides the first direct evidence of the impact of enforcing insider regulations on the informativeness of insider trades and stock price efficiency across 44 countries with varying levels of insider trading regulations. Results suggest that insider purchases earn abnormal profits, especially in countries with active enforcement of insider trading regulations. We further show that while insiders trade less before earnings announcements in countries with active enforcement, their stock prices react more to earnings news than those in countries without active enforcement. Overall, our results support the view that effective insider trading regulation promotes price efficiency.

中文翻译：

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内幕交易，信息量和全球价格效率

本文提供了第一个直接证据，表明在有不同水平的内幕交易法规的情况下，实施内幕法规对44个国家内幕交易信息性和股价效率的影响。结果表明，内幕交易会获得不正常的利润，特别是在积极执行内幕交易法规的国家。我们进一步表明，尽管内部人员在实施积极执法的国家发布财报之前交易较少，但与未实施积极实施的国家相比，其股价对盈利消息的反应更大。总体而言，我们的结果支持以下观点：有效的内幕交易监管可提高价格效率。