We find that members of the House of Representatives who vote for deregulation are more likely to be employed in the private sector after leaving Congress than those who do not vote for deregulation. An analysis of voting behavior in a major financial regulation—the Gramm‐Leach‐Bliley Act of 1999—shows that representatives use voting to enhance their careers. The results are consistent with politicians' public rent‐seeking and show that political capital is as valuable for politicians as it is for companies.

中文翻译：

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政治资本：国会对金融法规的投票分析

我们发现，投票反对放松管制的众议院议员比不投票反对放松管制的议员更有可能在私营部门工作。对一项主要金融法规（1999年的《格拉姆-里奇-布莱利法案》）中投票行为的分析表明，代表们使用投票来改善自己的职业生涯。结果与政治家的公共寻租行为是一致的，并且表明政治资本对政治家和公司都同样有价值。