This paper explores family business groups and their motivation for risk taking in each affiliate. We study whether the controlling family determines the level of risk taken by an affiliate in its business group based on the amount of family wealth that is invested in the affiliate. We find that the affiliates in which the controlling family has more (less) investment take less (more) risk. Our results indicate that the controlling family decides the riskiness of each affiliate based on the family’s interests at both the firm level and the business‐group level.

中文翻译：

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在业务组中控制家庭的风险分配

本文探讨了家族企业集团及其在每个分支机构中承担风险的动机。我们研究控制家族是否根据在分支机构中投资的家族财富来确定分支机构在其业务组中承担的风险级别。我们发现，控股家族拥有更多（更少）投资的分支机构承担的风险更少（更多）。我们的结果表明，控制家族根据公司和企业集团两个家族的利益来决定每个会员的风险。