The governance literature finds that independent directors from lending banks (commercial bank directors or CBDs) bring both financial expertise and conflict of interest between shareholders and debt holders. We examine how the presence of CBDs affects the implicit incentive of CEO turnover. Using BoardEx and DealScan data, we hypothesize and find that CBDs make the CEO turnover more sensitive to both performance and risk. Post‐CEO turnover analysis reveals that firm performance improves and risk decreases in the presence of CBDs.

中文翻译：

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董事会的银行家和首席执行官的流失

治理文献发现，来自贷款银行的独立董事（商业银行董事或CBD）带来了财务专业知识以及股东与债务持有人之间的利益冲突。我们研究了CBD的存在如何影响首席执行官离职的内在动机。通过使用BoardEx和DealScan数据，我们进行了假设并发现，CBD使首席执行官的离职对绩效和风险更加敏感。首席执行官后的营业额分析表明，在存在中央商务区的情况下，公司的业绩有所提高，风险有所降低。