This paper examines the effect of the level of CEO optimism on loan spread and number of covenants using 4869 loan facilities (tranches) made to 1271 U.S. industrial firms over the period 1992–2011. We find that banks charge significantly lower spreads and impose a smaller number of covenants on loans made to firms with moderately optimistic CEOs. However, banks tend to charge higher costs on loans made to firms with low‐ or high‐optimism CEOs. The results suggest that the level of CEO optimism and the costs of bank loans have a convex relation.

中文翻译：

---

CEO乐观与银行债务成本

本文研究了1992年至2011年间，使用向1271家美国工业公司提供的4869笔贷款（分期付款），CEO乐观水平对贷款息差和契约数量的影响。我们发现，银行收取的利差大大降低，并且对发放给首席执行官较为乐观的公司的贷款实施了较少的约定。但是，银行往往会对向具有低乐观或高乐观首席执行官的公司提供的贷款收取更高的成本。结果表明，首席执行官的乐观程度与银行贷款成本之间存在凸关系。