When network users are satisficing decision-makers, the resulting traffic pattern attains a satisficing user equilibrium, which may deviate from the (perfectly rational) user equilibrium. In a satisficing user equilibrium traffic pattern, the total system travel time can be worse than in the case of the PRUE. We show how bad the worst-case satisficing user equilibrium traffic pattern can be, compared to the perfectly rational user equilibrium. We call the ratio between the total system travel times of the two traffic patterns the price of satisficing, for which we provide an analytical bound. We compare the analytical bound with numerical bounds for several transportation networks.

中文翻译：

---

网络用户均衡中的满意价格

当网络用户使决策者满意时，最终的流量模式将达到令人满意的用户平衡，这可能会偏离（完全合理的）用户平衡。在令人满意的用户均衡流量模式下，总系统旅行时间可能比PRUE的情况差。我们展示了与完全理性的用户均衡相比，最坏情况下满足用户均衡的流量模式有多糟糕。我们将两种交通方式的总系统行驶时间之间的比率称为满足的价格，为此我们提供了一个分析界线。我们将几个交通网络的解析边界与数值边界进行比较。