Recent years have seen attempts by many philosophers to rehabilitate, with some modifications, a traditional doctrine of ethical intuitionism (henceforward ‘‘intuitionism’’). Contemporary intuitionists claim that moral knowledge consists of those propositions that are known by intellectual reflection (intuition), by moral observation or by moral emotion, or which are capable of being cogently inferred from propositions which are items of moral knowledge. Some intuitionists, such as Michael Huemer, admit only intuition (of particular or of general propositions) as a non-inferential source of moral knowledge; but others, such as Robert Audi, allow also moral observation and moral emotion. I offer a critique of contemporary intuitionist theories that depends upon their common structure: analysis of the abstract features of the approach show it to be an inadequate account of moral knowledge. I use Huemer and Audi as representative intuitionists. The differences between their views, and between their views and those of other intuitionists, are incidental at the level of generality of my argument. In section 2, I outline the contemporary intuitionist approach to moral knowledge. In sections 3, 4 and 5, I show that the problem of inter-cultural conflict undermines the claims that moral intuition, moral observation and moral emotion, respectively, are sources of non-inferential moral knowledge. I also explain the inadequacy of the intuitionist attempt to solve the problem by invoking bias or intellectual or moral failings. In section 6, I argue that the intuitionist attempt to solve the problem of conflict by attenuating the content of intuitive knowledge does not succeed. It also generates the further problem of explaining how insubstantial

中文翻译：

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伦理直觉主义：结构性批判

近年来，许多哲学家试图通过一些修改来恢复道德直觉主义的传统学说（以下称为“直觉主义”）。当代直觉主义者声称，道德知识由通过智力反思（直觉）、通过道德观察或通过道德情感知道的那些命题组成，或者能够从作为道德知识项目的命题中令人信服地推断出来的命题组成。一些直觉主义者，例如迈克尔·休默 (Michael Huemer)，只承认（特定或一般命题的）直觉是道德知识的非推理来源；但其他人，如罗伯特·奥迪，也允许道德观察和道德情感。我对基于其共同结构的当代直觉主义理论提出了批评：对该方法抽象特征的分析表明，它是对道德知识的不充分说明。我使用 Huemer 和 Audi 作为代表性的直觉主义者。他们的观点之间的差异，以及他们的观点与其他直觉主义者的观点之间的差异，在我的论点的一般性层面上是偶然的。在第 2 节中，我概述了当代直觉主义的道德知识方法。在第 3、4 和 5 节中，我表明跨文化冲突问题削弱了道德直觉、道德观察和道德情感分别是非推理性道德知识来源的主张。我还解释了直觉主义试图通过援引偏见或智力或道德缺陷来解决问题的不足之处。在第 6 节中，我认为直觉主义者试图通过削弱直觉知识的内容来解决冲突问题的尝试没有成功。它还产生了进一步的问题，即解释如何非实质性