当前位置: X-MOL 学术The Journal of Value Inquiry › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Anscombe on the Sources of Normativity
The Journal of Value Inquiry ( IF 0.6 ) Pub Date : 2016-05-27 , DOI: 10.1007/s10790-016-9562-9
Katharina Nieswandt

Anscombe is usually seen as a critic of “Modern Moral Philosophy.” I attempt a systematic reconstruction and a defense of Anscombe’s positive theory. Anscombe’s metaethics is a hybrid of social constructivism and Aristotelian naturalism. Her three main claims are the following: (1) We cannot trace all duties back to one moral principle; there is more than one source of normativity. (2) Whether I have a certain duty will often be determined by the social practices of my community. For instance, duties imposed by other people’s rights are socially constructed. (3) Whether something constitutes a good, however, will often be determined by human nature—which is not socially constructed.

中文翻译:

Anscombe 关于规范性的来源

Anscombe 通常被视为“现代道德哲学”的批评者。我试图对 Anscombe 的实证理论进行系统的重构和辩护。Anscombe 的元伦理学是社会建构主义和亚里士多德自然主义的混合体。她的三个主要主张如下:(1)我们不能将所有职责追溯到一个道德原则;规范性的来源不止一种。(2) 我是否有某种职责,往往取决于我所在社区的社会实践。例如,其他人的权利所施加的义务是社会建构的。(3) 然而,某物是否构成善,往往是由人性决定的——这不是社会建构的。
更新日期:2016-05-27
down
wechat
bug