The authors of this clear and helpful book present three positions on patriotism: Simon Keller sees patriotism as a negative moral phenomenon; John Kleinig takes patriotism to be morally recommendable; and Igor Primoratz presents a middle position. Primoratz distinguishes between worldly patriotism (concerned with a country’s cultural vibrancy, the beauty of its natural scenery, its political power, etc.) and ethical patriotism (concerned with the country’s moral integrity and wellbeing), on the other. He disagrees with Keller that worldly patriotism is a negative moral phenomenon and with Kleinig that it is a positive one, arguing that worldly patriotism is merely morally permissible. However, like Kleinig, Primoratz takes ethical patriotism to be morally recommendable, even if for reasons different from Kleinig’s. I cannot hope to do justice here to the intricate web of distinctions, examples, arguments, and counterarguments that these three philosophers offer for their own views and against others; for each of them, I will present only their general position and one or two of their moves. Keller’s case against patriotism is not based on the universalist argument, according to which all people should be cared for similarly. Universalists hold that it is wrong to care more for some people just because they are on one’s own side of the border rather than on the other side, and that when patriots prefer their compatriots they are discriminating between people on the basis of a morally irrelevant characteristic. But universalists should also hold, under pain of inconsistency, that people’s special concern for their children or friends is wrong. Keller cannot accept this implication, and hence rejects universalism altogether. His own argument against patriotism is based instead on what Sartre calls bad faith, that is, self-deception and willful ignorance: according to Keller, when patriots consider their country in a favorable way, they do not see reality as it is. They beautify in

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John Kleinig、Simon Keller 和 Igor Primoratz，爱国主义伦理：一场辩论。英国奇切斯特：John Wiley，2015 年。ISBN 978-0-470-65885-7，23.50 英镑，Pbk

这本清晰而有用的书的作者对爱国主义提出了三个立场：西蒙·凯勒将爱国主义视为一种消极的道德现象；John Kleinig 认为爱国主义在道德上是值得推荐的；而 Igor Primoratz 则处于中间位置。普里莫拉茨区分世俗爱国主义（关注一个国家的文化活力、自然风光之美、政治权力等）和伦理爱国主义（关注国家的道德完整性和福祉）。他不同意凯勒认为世俗的爱国主义是一种消极的道德现象，不同意克莱尼格的看法，认为这是一种积极的现象，认为世俗的爱国主义只是道德上允许的。然而，像 Kleinig 一样，Primoratz 认为道德爱国主义在道德上是值得推荐的，即使其原因与 Kleinig 的不同。我不能希望在这里对这三位哲学家为他们自己的观点和反对他人的观点提供的复杂的区别、例子、论点和反驳的网络做出公正的评价。对于他们每个人，我只会介绍他们的大致位置和他们的一两个举动。凯勒反对爱国主义的理由不是基于普遍主义的论点，根据该论点，所有人都应该得到同样的关怀。普遍主义者认为，仅仅因为某些人在边界的自己一侧而不是在另一侧而更多地关心他们是错误的，并且当爱国者偏爱他们的同胞时，他们是基于与道德无关的特征来歧视人. 但普遍主义者也应该在不一致的痛苦下坚持认为人们对他们的孩子或朋友的特别关注是错误的。凯勒无法接受这种暗示，因此完全拒绝普遍主义。他自己反对爱国主义的论点是基于萨特所说的恶意，即自欺欺人和故意无知：根据凯勒的说法，当爱国者以有利的方式看待他们的国家时，他们并没有看到现实。他们在美化