The past two decades have witnessed the emergence of a conviction on both sides of the Atlantic that Western democratic governments have forgotten the art of strategy. In 2011 the United Kingdom Parliament’s Public Administration Select Committee castigated PrimeMinister David Cameron’s administration as having “lost the capacity to think strategically” and demanded that politicians “reclaim the art of creating ‘national strategy.’” In the United States, attacks on official policy are often framed in similar terms. “America needs a grand strategy,” critics claim, decrying the “strategic incoherence” that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War in 1991. These commentators have ambitious hopes for what such a strategy might achieve. “Grand strategy,” they believe, can “help the American people and their policy makers answer some of the fundamental questions about what choices to make in foreign policy.” Thus far, calls for restraint in the application of the term “grand strategy” and in the aspirations attached to it appear to have gone largely unheeded. As a result, we now face a situation in which the indiscriminate employment of the term compromises the sort of clear-sighted discussions of national security its advocates hope to foster. Exaggerated hopes for what “grand strategy” can achieve endure, offering

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大战略的历史和危险

在过去的二十年里，大西洋两岸都出现了一种信念，即西方民主政府已经忘记了战略艺术。2011 年，英国议会公共行政特别委员会谴责首相戴维·卡梅伦 (David Cameron) 的政府“失去了战略思考的能力”，并要求政客“重新掌握制定‘国家战略’的艺术。”在美国，对官方政策的攻击经常用类似的术语来描述。“美国需要一个大战略，”批评者声称，并谴责自 1991 年冷战结束以来普遍存在的“战略不一致”。这些评论员对这样的战略可能实现的目标抱有雄心勃勃的希望。“大战略”，他们相信，可以“帮助美国人民及其决策者回答一些关于外交政策选择的基本问题。” 迄今为止，在应用“大战略”一词及其所附的愿望方面要求克制的呼吁似乎基本上无人理会。结果，我们现在面临这样一种情况，即不加区别地使用该术语会损害其倡导者希望促进的那种关于国家安全的清晰讨论。对“大战略”可以实现的夸大的希望持久，提供 我们现在面临这样一种情况，即不加区别地使用这个词会损害其倡导者希望促进的那种关于国家安全的清晰讨论。对“大战略”可以实现的夸大的希望持久，提供 我们现在面临这样一种情况，即不加区别地使用这个词会损害其倡导者希望促进的那种关于国家安全的清晰讨论。对“大战略”可以实现的夸大的希望持久，提供