authors of this book will be aware, Marc Flandreau has attempted to debunk the cooperation/coordination hypothesis, giving more prominence to the selfi sh nature of central banks. In this view, cooperation is possible, but only when it provides a direct benefi t. It is quite different from a process of mutually adjusting toward some cooperative equilibrium. Flandreau posits a game-theoretic scenario in which the “core” (London and/or New York) is suffi ciently dominant or hegemonic to induce the “periphery” (Tokyo) to act in the interest of the core, which reaps most of the benefi ts. In this scenario, the periphery is at once much more active and more contributing than is commonly acknowledged. If we conceive the world’s monetary geography as differentiated between core and periphery (rather than as uniform players), this logic makes perfect sense. Factually, Bytheway and Metzler agree with this thesis, but at times I would have liked Central Banks and Gold to explore this dynamic further, for instance when noting, correctly, that Japan’s return to the gold standard in 1930 was also hastened by concerns about the country’s international prestige, and, hence, an understanding of its secondary status within the world’s monetary pyramid. These are, however, theoretical abstractions that should not detract from the merits of Bytheway and Metzler’s fi ndings. If anything, their eminently readable book demonstrates the continuing value of archival research, including in those archives that would seem to have given up all their secrets. Central Banks and Gold is an enticing read, and, even if one does not agree with all of the authors’ hypotheses, the extensive use of innovative archival material will compel readers to update their opinions. It will be of interest to fi nancial historians as well as students of imperialism, the gold standard, and central banking.

中文翻译：

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在旭日的阴影下：大屠杀时代的日本和犹太​​人 by Meron Medzini

这本书的作者会意识到，马克弗兰德罗试图揭穿合作/协调假说，更加突出中央银行的自私性质。在这种观点下，合作是可能的，但前提是合作提供了直接的好处。这与相互调整以达到某种合作平衡的过程大不相同。Flandreau 假设了一个博弈论场景，其中“核心”（伦敦和/或纽约）具有足够的主导地位或霸权，以诱导“外围”（东京）为核心利益行事，核心收获了大部分好处。在这种情况下，外围立即比通常公认的要活跃得多，贡献也多得多。如果我们将世界货币地理视为核心和外围（而不是统一参与者）之间的差异，这个逻辑非常有道理。事实上，Bytheway 和 Metzler 同意这个论点，但有时我希望中央银行和黄金进一步探索这种动态，例如，当正确地注意到日本在 1930 年回归金本位制也因担心国家的国际声望，从而了解其在世界货币金字塔中的次要地位。然而，这些都是理论上的抽象，不应减损 Bytheway 和 Metzler 发现的优点。如果有的话，他们可读性极佳的书展示了档案研究的持续价值，包括那些似乎已经放弃了所有秘密的档案。《中央银行与黄金》是一本引人入胜的读物，即使人们不同意作者的所有假设，创新档案材料的广泛使用将迫使读者更新他们的意见。金融历史学家以及帝国主义、金本位制和中央银行的学生都会对此感兴趣。