The boundaries of social categories are frequently altered to serve normative projects, such as social reform. Griffiths and Khalidi argue that the value-driven modification of categories diminishes the epistemic value of social categories. I argue that concerns over value-modified categories are an endorsement of problematic assumptions of the value-free ideal of science. Contrary to those concerns, non-epistemic value considerations can increase the epistemic success of a scientific category. For example, the early history of the category infantile autism shows how non-epistemic value considerations can contribute to delimiting and establishing infantile autism as a distinct category in mainstream psychiatry. In the case of infantile autism, non-epistemic considerations have led to a new interpretation of existing data, the expansion of research to include biology, and the creation of diagnostic criteria that further contribute to collecting relevant data. Given this case study, we see that non-epistemic considerations may not be epistemically detrimental but can be epistemically beneficial in scientific classification.

中文翻译：

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非认知价值如何​​在科学分类中对认知有益

社会类别的界限经常被改变以服务于规范项目，例如社会改革。Griffiths 和 Khalidi 认为，价值驱动的类别修改降低了社会类别的认知价值。我认为，对价值修正类别的关注是对科学的价值中立理想的有问题假设的认可。与这些担忧相反，非认知价值考虑可以增加科学类别的认知成功。例如，婴儿自闭症类别的早期历史表明，非认知价值考虑如何有助于将婴儿自闭症界定和确立为主流精神病学中的一个独特类别。在婴儿自闭症的案例中，非认知因素导致了对现有数据的新解释，扩大研究以包括生物学，并制定进一步有助于收集相关数据的诊断标准。鉴于这个案例研究，我们看到非认知考虑可能不会在认知上有害，但在科学分类中可能在认知上有益。