John D. Norton is responsible for a number of influential views in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper will discuss two of them. The material theory of induction claims that inductive arguments are ultimately justified by their material features, not their formal features. Thus, while a deductive argument can be valid irrespective of the content of the propositions that make up the argument, an inductive argument about, say, apples, will be justified (or not) depending on facts about apples. The argument view of thought experiments claims that thought experiments are arguments, and that they function epistemically however arguments do. These two views have generated a great deal of discussion, although there hasn't been much written about their combination. I argue that despite some interesting harmonies, there is a serious tension between them. I consider several options for easing this tension, before suggesting a set of changes to the argument view that I take to be consistent with Norton's fundamental philosophical commitments, and which retain what seems intuitively correct about the argument view. These changes require that we move away from a unitary epistemology of thought experiments and towards a more pluralist position.

约翰·诺顿（John D. Norton）负责当代科学哲学中的许多有影响力的观点。本文将讨论其中两个。归纳的物质理论主张归纳论证最终是由其物质特征而不是形式特征证明的。因此，尽管演绎论证是有效的，而与构成该论证的命题内容无关，但关于苹果的归纳论证将根据（关于或不对）苹果的事实进行辩护。思想实验的论证观点声称思想实验是论证，论据却是认识论的。这两种观点引起了很多讨论，尽管关于它们的组合并没有写太多文章。我认为尽管有一些有趣的和谐，但它们之间还是存在着严重的紧张关系。在提出对论点观点的一系列变更之前，我考虑了几种缓解这种紧张的选择，我认为这些改变与诺顿的基本哲学承诺是一致的，并且保留了论点观点似乎在直觉上是正确的。这些变化要求我们从思想实验的统一认识论转向更多元化的立场。