:In this essay, I consider a particular version of the thesis that the blameworthy deserve to suffer, namely, that they deserve to feel guilty to the proper degree (a thesis I call "Desert-Guilt"). Two further theses have been thought to explicate and support the thesis, one that appeals to the non-instrumental goodness of the blameworthy receiving what they deserve (in this case, the experience of guilt), and the other that appeals to the idea that being blameworthy provides reason to promote the blameworthy receiving what they deserve (again, in this case, the experience of guilt). I call the first "Good-Guilt" and the second "Reason-Guilt.” I begin by exploring what I take to be the strongest argument for Good-Guilt which gains force from a comparison of guilt and grief, and the strongest argument against. I conclude that Good-Guilt might be true, but that even if it is, the strongest argument in favor of it fails to support it in a way that provides reason for the thesis that the blameworthy deserve to feel guilty. I then consider the hypothesis that Reason-Guilt might be true and might be the more fundamental principle, supporting both Good-Guilt and Desert-Guilt. I argue that it does not succeed, however, and instead propose a different principle, according to which being blameworthy does not by itself provide reason for promoting that the blameworthy get what they deserve, but that being blameworthy systematically does so in conjunction with particular kinds of background circumstances. Finally, I conclude that Desert-Guilt might yet be true, but that it does not clearly gain support from either Good-Guilt or Reason-Guilt.

中文翻译：

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内疚、悲伤和美好

: 在这篇文章中，我考虑了一个特定版本的论点，即应受责备的人应该受苦，即他们应该在适当程度上感到内疚（我称之为“沙漠-内疚”的论点）。另外两篇论文被认为可以解释和支持这一论点，一篇呼吁应受责备的人接受他们应得的东西（在这种情况下，内疚的经历）的非工具性善，另一篇呼吁认为存在应受责备提供了促使应受责备的人接受他们应得的东西的理由（再次，在这种情况下，内疚的经历）。我称第一个为“Good-Guilt”，第二个为“Reason-Guilt”。我首先探讨了我认为最有力的支持Good-Guilt的论据，它从内疚和悲伤的比较中获得力量，以及最强烈的反对论据。我的结论是 Good-Guilt 可能是真的，但即使是真的，支持它的最有力论据也无法以某种方式支持它，从而为应受谴责者应该感到内疚的论点提供理由。然后，我考虑理性内疚可能是真的假设，并且可能是更基本的原则，同时支持良好内疚和沙漠内疚。然而，我认为它并没有成功，而是提出了一个不同的原则，根据该原则，受责备本身并不能提供理由来促进应受责备的人得到他们应得的东西，而是应受责备系统地与特定种类一起这样做的背景情况。最后，我得出结论，Desert-Guilt 可能仍然是真的，但它并没有明显地得到 Good-Guilt 或 Reason-Guilt 的支持。