In 2018, Russia's last tsar, Nicholas II, was the most popular of all Russian historical figures of the twentieth century; the fame of White officers such as Alexander Kolchak and Anton Denikin was also on the rise. Obviously, broad sympathy for the last Romanov does not imply support for a potential restoration of the monarchy, yet the past few years have seen the activation of several monarchist lobbies, especially around the Russian Orthodox Church and in some well-connected Kremlin circles that seek the ideological hardening of the Putin regime. In this article, I use the case study of the monarchist idea to explore how the Kremlin manages the production of a large and diversified set of ideologies. I explore how the relationship between state authorities, ideological entrepreneurs, and some societal actors such as the Church is articulated along a continuum of permanent complementarity and competition in the production of ideologies.

中文翻译：

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意识形态互补还是竞争？当今俄罗斯的克里姆林宫、教会和君主制思想

2018年，俄罗斯末代沙皇尼古拉二世成为20世纪所有俄罗斯历史人物中最受欢迎的；亚历山大·高尔察克和安东·邓尼金等白人军官的名气也在上升。显然，对最后一位罗曼诺夫的广泛同情并不意味着支持潜在的君主制复辟，但在过去几年里，一些君主主义游说团活跃起来，尤其是在俄罗斯东正教教堂周围和一些关系密切的克里姆林宫圈子中寻求普京政权的意识形态固化。在本文中，我使用君主主义思想的案例研究来探索克里姆林宫如何管理大量和多样化的意识形态的产生。我探讨了国家当局、意识形态企业家、和意识形态生产的竞争。