Typically, the imagination in thought experiments has been taken to consist in mental images; we visualize the state of affairs described. A recent alternative from Fiora Salis and Roman Frigg maintains that it is only the propositional imagination that is necessary for the conduct of a thought experiment. I set out problems with these monistic accounts and develop a pluralist stance. Thought experiments appeal to a variety of our imaginative capacities, and we ought to focus on the function of particular thought experiments when considering what type of imaginative engagement they invite.

中文翻译：

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对科学想象力的多元解释

通常，思想实验中的想象力被认为包含在心理图像中；我们将所描述的事态形象化。Fiora Salis 和 Roman Frigg 最近的一个替代方案坚持认为，进行思想实验只需要命题想象。我提出了这些一元论的问题，并发展出多元主义的立场。思想实验对我们的各种想象能力具有吸引力，在考虑它们邀请何种类型的想象参与时，我们应该关注特定思想实验的功能。