This article examines the multiple realizability thesis within a causal framework. The beginnings of this framework are found in Elliott Sober’s “Multiple Realizability Argument against Reduction,” which argues that the multiple realizability thesis poses no challenge to reductive explanation. While Sober’s causal approach has the potential to reveal new insights, I argue that his setup fails to capture important aspects of the multiple realizability thesis. After correcting for these issues, I argue that this causal framework reveals something quite different. It reveals how multiple realizability relates to a common type of causal complexity in biology that poses problems for reductive explanation.

中文翻译：

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从因果角度看多重可实现性

本文在因果框架内检验了多重可实现性命题。这个框架的开端可以在 Elliott Sober 的“Multiple Realizability Argument against Reduction”中找到，该论证认为多重实现性命题对还原解释没有挑战。虽然 Sober 的因果方法有可能揭示新的见解，但我认为他的设置未能捕捉到多重可实现性论题的重要方面。在纠正了这些问题之后，我认为这个因果框架揭示了一些完全不同的东西。它揭示了多重可实现性如何与生物学中一种常见的因果复杂性相关，这种复杂性给还原性解释带来了问题。