Substantive counterlegal discourse poses a problem for those according to whom the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. I discern two types of necessitarianism about laws: dispositional essentialism and modal necessitarianism. I argue that Toby Handfield’s response to the problem of counterlegals cannot help the modal necessitarian, according to whom all possible worlds are identical with respect to the laws. I thus propose a fictionalist treatment of counterlegals. Fictions are not limited by metaphysical possibility; hence, fictionalism affords the modal necessitarian the means to account for the apparent substance of counterlegals even granting the metaphysical necessity of the laws.

中文翻译：

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必要的法律和反法律问题

实质性的反法律话语对那些认为自然法则在形而上学上是必要的人来说是一个问题。我辨别出两种关于法律的必然主义：倾向本质主义和模态必然主义。我认为托比·汉德菲尔德对反法律问题的回应不能帮助模态必然主义者，根据他的说法，所有可能的世界在法律方面都是相同的。因此，我建议对反法律进行虚构的处理。小说不受形而上学可能性的限制；因此，虚构主义为模态必然论提供了解释反法律的表面实质的手段，甚至承认法律的形而上学的必要性。