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Price Bargaining and Competition in Online Platforms: An Empirical Analysis of the Daily Deal Market
Marketing Science ( IF 4.0 ) Pub Date : 2020-07-01 , DOI: 10.1287/mksc.2019.1213
Lingling Zhang 1 , Doug J. Chung 2
Affiliation  

The prevalence of online platforms opens new doors to traditional businesses for customer reach and revenue growth. This research investigates platform competition in a setting in which prices are determined by negotiations between platforms (specifically, their salespeople) and businesses. We compile a unique and comprehensive data set from the U.S. daily deal market, where merchants offer deals to generate revenues and attract new customers. We specify and estimate a two-stage supply-side model in which platforms and merchants bargain on the wholesale price of deals. Based on Nash bargaining solutions, our model generates insights into how bargaining power and bargaining position jointly determine price and firm profits. By working with a bigger platform, merchants enjoy a larger customer base, but they are subject to lower margins because of less bargaining power. Counterfactual results reveal that, in the absence of platform competition, merchants are worse off owing to their weaker bargaining position, but consumers experience lower prices, thus leading to an increase in total demand.

中文翻译:

在线平台的价格讨价还价和竞争:每日交易市场的实证分析

在线平台的普及为传统业务打开了新的大门,以扩大客户群并增加收入。这项研究调查了平台竞争的情况,在这种情况下,价格由平台(特别是其销售人员)与企业之间的谈判确定。我们从美国每日交易市场中收集了一个独特而全面的数据集,商家在这里提供交易以产生收入并吸引新客户。我们指定并估计一个两阶段的供应方模型,在该模型中,平台和商户以交易的批发价进行讨价还价。基于Nash议价解决方案,我们的模型可深入了解议价能力和议价地位如何共同决定价格和公司利润。通过使用更大的平台,商家可以享有更大的客户群,但由于议价能力较低,它们的利润率较低。反事实结果表明,在没有平台竞争的情况下,由于议价能力较弱,商家的情况更糟,但消费者的价格较低,从而导致总需求增加。
更新日期:2020-07-01
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