Richard Posner’s “What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?” (1993b) is not, as usually believed, the first analysis of judges’ behaviors made by using the assumption that judges are rational and maximize a utility function. That analysis arrived at the end of a rather long process. This paper recounts the history of this process, from the “birth” of law and economics in the 1960s to 1993. We show that economic analyses of judges’ behavior were introduced in the early 1970s under the pen of Posner. At that time, rationality was not modeled in terms of utility maximization. Utility maximization came later. We also show that rationality and incentives were introduced to explain the efficiency of common law. Around this theme, a controversy took place that led Posner and other economists to postpone their analysis of judicial behavior until the 1990s. By then, the situation had changed. New and conclusive evidence of judges’ utility maximizing behavior demanded a general theory to be expressed. In addition, the context was favorable to Chicago economists. It was time for Posner to publish his article.

中文翻译：

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没有浪漫的正义：1960-1993 年法官行为经济分析的历史

理查德波斯纳的“法官和大法官最大化什么？” （1993b）并不是像通常认为的那样，第一次使用法官是理性的并最大化效用函数的假设对法官的行为进行分析。这一分析是在一个相当长的过程结束时完成的。本文叙述了这一过程的历史，从 1960 年代法律和经济学的“诞生”到 1993 年。我们表明，对法官行为的经济学分析是在 1970 年代初期在波斯纳的笔下引入的。那时，理性还没有根据效用最大化来建模。效用最大化后来出现。我们还展示了引入理性和激励来解释普通法的效率。围绕这个主题发生了一场争论，导致波斯纳和其他经济学家将他们对司法行为的分析推迟到 1990 年代。到那时，情况已经发生了变化。法官的效用最大化行为的新的和确凿的证据需要表达一个普遍的理论。此外，背景对芝加哥经济学家有利。波斯纳是时候发表他的文章了。