We know that Homo sapiens will not exist forever. Given this, how should our species end? What are the reasons, if any, to delay our extinction? In this paper, I show that the pre-eminent reasons which favor prolonging the existence of the species are partial: they will arise from the particular attachments and projects of the final few generations. While there may also be impartial reasons to prolong the species, these reasons are liable, with time, to reverse their valence: we can be reasonably confident that they will ultimately recommend hastening the demise of the species. Consequently, it is likely that our descendants will eventually face a difficult – possibly tragic – conflict, between partial duties that recommend living on, and an impartial duty to extinguish the species.

中文翻译：

---

一个好的退出：我们物种的终结怎么办？

我们知道智人不会永远存在。鉴于此，我们的物种应该如何结束？如果有的话，推迟我们灭绝的原因是什么？在这篇论文中，我展示了有利于延长物种存在的主要理由是部分的：它们将产生于最后几代的特定依恋和计划。虽然延长物种可能也有公正的理由，但随着时间的推移，这些理由很可能会逆转它们的价态：我们可以有理由相信，它们最终会建议加速物种的灭亡。因此，我们的后代很可能最终会面临一场困难的——可能是悲剧的——冲突，在建议继续生存的部分责任和消灭物种的公正责任之间。