Moral error theorists hold that morality is deeply mistaken, thus raising the question of whether and how moral judgments and utterances should continue to be employed. Proposals include simply abolishing morality (Richard Garner), adopting some revisionary fictionalist stance toward morality (Richard Joyce), and conserving moral judgments and utterances unchanged (Jonas Olson). I defend a fourth proposal, namely revisionary moral expressivism, which recommends replacing cognitivist moral judgments and utterances with non-cognitivist ones. Given that non-cognitivist attitudes are not truth apt, revisionary expressivism does not involve moral error. Moreover, revisionary expressivism has the theoretical resources to retain many of the useful features of morality, such as moral motivation, moral disagreement, and moral reasoning. Revisionary expressivism fares better than the three major alternatives in both avoiding moral error and preserving these useful features of morality. I also show how this position differs from the “revolutionary expressivism” of Sebastian Kohler and Michael Ridge.

中文翻译：

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为什么道德错误理论家应该成为修正性的道德表现主义者

道德错误理论家认为道德是严重错误的，因此提出了是否以及如何继续使用道德判断和言论的问题。建议包括简单地废除道德（理查德·加纳），对道德采取一些修正的虚构主义立场（理查德·乔伊斯），以及保持道德判断和言论不变（乔纳斯·奥尔森）。我为第四个提议辩护，即修正性道德表现主义，它建议用非认知主义的道德判断和话语取代认知主义的道德判断和话语。鉴于非认知主义的态度不符合真理，修正表现主义不涉及道德错误。此外，修正表现主义具有保留道德的许多有用特征的理论资源，例如道德动机、道德分歧和道德推理。修正表现主义在避免道德错误和保留这些有用的道德特征方面都比三种主要选择要好。我还展示了这一立场与塞巴斯蒂安·科勒 (Sebastian Kohler) 和迈克尔·里奇 (Michael Ridge) 的“革命表现主义”有何不同。