My paper has two aims: to underscore the importance of differently time-indexed ‘ought implies can’ principles, and to apply this to the culpable inability problem. Sometimes we make ourselves unable to do what we ought, but in those cases, we may still fail to do what we ought. This is taken to be a serious problem for synchronic ‘ought implies can’ principles, with a simultaneous ‘ought’ and ‘can.’ Some take it to support diachronic ‘ought implies can,’ with a potentially temporally distinct ‘ought’ and ‘can.’ I will argue that this problem is not avoided by diachronic ‘ought implies can.’

中文翻译：

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共时性和历时性“应该意味着可以”的有罪无能问题

我的论文有两个目的：强调不同时间索引的“应该意味着可以”原则的重要性，并将其应用于有罪的无能问题。有时我们让自己无法做我们应该做的事，但在这些情况下，我们可能仍然无法做我们应该做的事。对于同步的“应该意味着可以”原则，同时具有“应该”和“可以”，这被认为是一个严重的问题。有些人认为它支持历时性的“应该意味着可以”，具有潜在的时间上不同的“应该”和“可以”。我会争辩说，历时性的“应该意味着可以”并不能避免这个问题。