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Emotions, Character, and Associationist Psychology
Journal of Moral Philosophy ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2017-12-09 , DOI: 10.1163/17455243-46810069
Robert C. Roberts , Adam C. Pelser

Emotions are pivotal in the manifestation and functioning of character traits. Traits such as virtues and vices involve emotions in diverse but connected ways. Some virtues (justice, generosity, compassion, truthfulness) are exemplified, in important part, by feeling emotions. Others (self-control, perseverance, courage) are exemplified in managing, bypassing, or even eliminating emotions. And one virtue at least (humility) is exemplified in not-feeling a certain range of emotions. Emotions are a kind of perceptual state, namely construal, involving concern or caring (motivation) about something, in which the elements of a situation are organized and understood in terms of their significance or import. Emotional understanding can be morally right or wrong. As such construals, emotions can be morally excellent (the feeling of joy about a rectified injustice) or perverse (envy and contempt of persons). Emotions thus have a logic or grammar that is crucial to their entering into, or being set upon by, or simply not occurring because of, virtues. The virtuous person is attuned, implicitly or reflectively, to this grammar, and that attunement constitutes one of the major dimensions of practical wisdom. An associationist psychology (behaviorist or Humean) attempts to reduce the conceptual and intentional richness of emotions to mere associations or correlations of pleasant or unpleasant “affect” with various things (behaviors, “values”). Such a psychology is fundamentally unfit to represent practical wisdom, and thus the moral life. We sketch an account of the generation and degeneration of character traits using the above conceptual framework and contrasting it with an associationist framework.

中文翻译:

情绪、性格和联想心理学

情绪在性格特征的表现和运作中起着关键作用。美德和恶习等特征以不同但相互关联的方式涉及情感。一些美德(正义、慷慨、同情、诚实)在重要的部分是通过感受情感来体现的。其他(自我控制、毅力、勇气)则体现在管理、绕过甚至消除情绪方面。至少有一种美德(谦逊)体现在不感受一定范围的情绪。情绪是一种感知状态,即解释性的,涉及对某事的关注或关心(动机),其中根据其重要性或意义来组织和理解情况的元素。情感理解在道德上可能是对的也可能是错的。作为这样的解释,情绪可以是道德上的优秀(对纠正的不公正感到高兴)或反常的(嫉妒和蔑视人)。因此,情绪具有一种逻辑或语法,对于它们进入美德、被美德影响或根本不因美德而发生至关重要。有德的人会默契地或反思地适应这种语法,而这种协调构成了实践智慧的主要维度之一。联想心理学(行为主义或休谟主义)试图将情感的概念和有意丰富性减少到仅仅是愉快或不愉快“影响”与各种事物(行为、“价值观”)的关联或关联。这种心理根本不适合代表实践智慧,因此也不适合代表道德生活。
更新日期:2017-12-09
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