There are a number of cases where, collectively, groups cause harm, and yet no single individual’s contribution to the collective makes any difference to the amount of harm that is caused. For instance, though human activity is collectively causing climate change, my individual greenhouse gas emissions are neither necessary nor sufficient for any harm that results from climate change. Some (e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong) take this to indicate that there is no individual moral obligation to reduce emissions. There is a collective action problem here, to which I offer a solution. My solution rests on an argument for a (sometimes) bare moral difference between intending harm and foreseeing with near certainty that harm will result as an unintended side-effect of one’s action. I conclude that we have a moral obligation to reduce our individual emissions, and, more broadly, an obligation to not participate in many other harmful group activities (e.g., factory-farming).

中文翻译：

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气候变化、个人排放和预见危害

在许多情况下，群体集体造成伤害，但没有任何个人对集体的贡献对造成的伤害量产生任何影响。例如，虽然人类活动共同导致气候变化，但我个人的温室气体排放对于气候变化造成的任何伤害既不必要也不充分。有些人（例如 Sinnott-Armstrong）认为这表明个人没有减少排放的道德义务。这里有一个集体行动问题，我提供了一个解决方案。我的解决方案基于一个论点，即故意伤害和几乎可以肯定地预见伤害将作为一个人的行为的意外副作用而导致（有时）纯粹的道德差异。我的结论是，我们有道德义务减少我们的个人排放，