In the growing literature on decision-making under moral uncertainty, a number of skeptics have argued that there is an insuperable barrier to rational “hedging” for the risk of moral error, namely the apparent incomparability of moral reasons given by rival theories like Kantianism and utilitarianism. Various general theories of intertheoretic value comparison have been proposed to counter this objection, but each suffers from apparently fatal flaws. In this paper, I propose a more modest approach that aims to identify classes of moral theories that share common principles strong enough to establish bases for intertheoretic comparison. I show that, contra the claims of skeptics, there are often rationally perspicuous grounds for precise, quantitative value comparisons within such classes. In light of this fact, I argue, the existence of some apparent incomparabilities between widely divergent moral theories cannot serve as a general argument against hedging for one’s moral uncertainties.

中文翻译：

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理论间价值比较：一个温和的建议

在越来越多的关于道德不确定性下的决策的文献中，一些怀疑论者认为理性“对冲”道德错误风险存在不可逾越的障碍，即康德主义和康德主义等竞争理论给出的道德理由明显不可比性。功利主义。已经提出了各种理论间价值比较的一般理论来反驳这一反对意见，但每种理论都存在明显的致命缺陷。在本文中，我提出了一种更温和的方法，旨在确定具有足够强大的共同原则以建立理论间比较基础的道德理论类别。我表明，与怀疑论者的主张相反，在这些类别中进行精确、定量的价值比较通常有合理的明显依据。鉴于这一事实，我认为，