Philosophers generally prescribe against complaining, or endorse only complaints directed to rectification of the circumstances. Notably, Aristotle and Kant aver that the importuning of others with one’s pains is effeminate and should never be done. In this paper, I reject the prohibition of complaint. The gendered aspects of Aristotle’s and Kant’s criticisms of complaint include their deploring a self-indulgent “softness” with respect to pain, yielding to feelings at the expense of remembering one’s duties to others and one’s own self-respect. I argue that complaining may also take the form of mindful attention to shared suffering. A complainer may observe affective duties, such as commiseration and invitations to disclose pains. Against more contemporary views that justify only constructive complaints directed to change, I suggest that quotidian, unconstructive complaining sometimes fulfills important social functions, including the amelioration of loneliness and affective solidarity, for the sake of others as well as oneself.

中文翻译：

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不能抱怨

哲学家通常反对抱怨，或者只认可旨在纠正情况的抱怨。值得注意的是，亚里士多德和康德断言，用自己的痛苦来强求他人是柔弱的，永远不应该这样做。在本文中，我拒绝禁止投诉。亚里士多德和康德对抱怨的批评的性别方面包括他们痛惜对痛苦的自我放纵的“柔软”，以牺牲对他人的责任和自己的自尊为代价屈服于感情。我认为抱怨也可以采取对共同痛苦的正念关注的形式。投诉者可能会履行情感职责，例如同情和邀请透露痛苦。反对更现代的观点，这些观点只证明针对变革的建设性抱怨是合理的，我建议日常，