1 Recklessness and Uncertainty: Jackson Cases and Merely Apparent Asymmetry (Forthcoming in Journal of Moral Philosophy) Claire Field Abstract: Is normative uncertainty like factual uncertainty? Should it have the same effects on our actions? Some have thought not. Those who defend an asymmetry between normative and factual uncertainty typically do so as part of the claim that our moral beliefs in general are irrelevant to both the moral value and the moral worth of our actions (Weatherson 2014; Harman 2015). Here I use the consideration of Jackson cases to challenge this view, arguing that we can explain away the apparent asymmetries between normative and factual uncertainty by considering the particular features of the cases in greater detail. Such consideration shows that, in fact, normative and factual uncertainty are equally relevant to moral assessment.

中文翻译：

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鲁莽和不确定性：杰克逊案件和仅仅是明显的不对称

1 鲁莽和不确定性：Jackson Cases and Merely Apparent Asymmetry（即将发表于Journal of Moral Philosophy） Claire Field 摘要：规范不确定性与事实不确定性一样吗？它应该对我们的行为产生同样的影响吗？有些人认为没有。那些捍卫规范不确定性和事实不确定性之间不对称的人通常会这样做，因为他们声称我们的道德信念通常与我们行为的道德价值和道德价值无关（Weatherson 2014；Harman 2015）。在这里，我使用对杰克逊案件的考虑来挑战这一观点，认为我们可以通过更详细地考虑案件的特定特征来解释规范和事实不确定性之间明显的不对称。这种考虑表明，事实上，