In Helen Frowe's book, Defensive Killing, she argues that some cases of seemingly futile self-defense are actually instances of justifiable defense of the victim's honor. This paper explores Frowe's claim, first by isolating the central cases and then by examining her rejection of punitive reasons. From there, the paper examines Frowe's understanding of "defense of honor," ultimately suggesting that Frowe's conception is best construed as action that has expressive, but not defensive, value. From there, I turn to two more general puzzles. First, what if the defender mistakenly believes that she can successfully defend and acts for that reason, but the reason that actually supports her action is not one she is acting in light of? And, second, how ought we to understand the interests of an aggressor who has forfeited his rights?

中文翻译：

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捍卫荣誉和超越：重新思考看似徒劳的防御与可允许的伤害之间的关系

在海伦·弗罗 (Helen Frowe) 的著作《防御性杀戮》(Defensive Killing) 中，她认为，一些看似徒劳的自卫案例实际上是为受害者的荣誉进行正当辩护的实例。本文探讨了弗罗的主张，首先通过隔离中心案例，然后通过检查她对惩罚性理由的拒绝。从那里，该论文检验了弗罗对“捍卫荣誉”的理解，最终表明弗罗的概念最好被解释为具有表现力而非防御性价值的行动。从那里，我转向两个更一般的谜题。第一，如果防御者错误地认为她可以成功防御并因此而采取行动，但实际上支持其行动的原因并不是她所依据的原因怎么办？其次，