What underlying logic explains candidate participation in vote buying, given that clientelist exchange is so difficult to enforce? We address this question through close analysis of campaigns by several dozen candidates in two electoral districts in Java, Indonesia. Analyzing candidates’ targeting and pricing strategies, we show that candidates used personal brokerage structures that drew on social networks to identify voters and deliver payments to them. But these candidates achieved vote totals averaging about one quarter of the number of payments they distributed. Many candidates claimed to be targeting loyalists, suggestive of “turnout buying,” but judged loyalty in personal rather than partisan terms, and extended their vote-buying reach through personal connections mediated by brokers. Candidates were market sensitive, paying prices per vote determined not only by personal resources, but also by constituency size and prices offered by competitors. Accordingly, we argue that a market logic structures Indonesia's system of vote buying.

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印度尼西亚的投票购买：候选策略、市场逻辑和有效性

鉴于客户名单交换如此难以执行，什么潜在逻辑解释了候选人参与投票？我们通过仔细分析印度尼西亚爪哇两个选区的数十名候选人的竞选活动来解决这个问题。通过分析候选人的目标和定价策略，我们表明候选人使用个人经纪结构利用社交网络来识别选民并向他们付款。但这些候选人的投票总数平均约为他们分发的付款数量的四分之一。许多候选人声称针对忠诚者，暗示“投票率购买”，但从个人而非党派角度判断忠诚度，并通过经纪人调解的个人关系扩大了他们的选票范围。候选人对市场敏感，每票支付的价格不仅取决于个人资源，还取决于选区规模和竞争对手提供的价格。因此，我们认为市场逻辑构建了印度尼西亚的投票购买系统。