How do the president's calculations in achieving policy goals shape the allocation of cabinet portfolios? Despite the growing literature on presidential cabinet appointments, this question has barely been addressed. I argue that cabinet appointments are strongly affected not only by presidential incentives to effectively deliver their key policy commitments but also by their interest in having their administration maintain strong political leverage. Through an analysis of portfolio allocations in South Korea after democratization, I demonstrate that the posts wherein ministers can influence the government's overall reputation typically go to nonpartisan professionals ideologically aligned with presidents, while the posts wherein ministers can exert legislators' influence generally go to senior copartisans. My findings highlight a critical difference in presidential portfolio allocation from parliamentary democracies, where key posts tend to be reserved for senior parliamentarians from the ruling party.

中文翻译：

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作为总统计算的投资组合分配：韩国的忠诚度、合作伙伴关系和政治背景

总统在实现政策目标方面的计算如何影响内阁投资组合的分配？尽管关于总统内阁任命的文献越来越多，但这个问题几乎没有得到解决。我认为，内阁任命不仅受到总统有效履行其关键政策承诺的激励措施的强烈影响，而且还受到他们对让政府保持强大政治影响力的兴趣的强烈影响。通过对民主化后韩国的投资组合分配的分析，我证明了部长可以影响政府整体声誉的职位通常由在意识形态上与总统保持一致的无党派专业人士担任，而部长可以施加立法者影响的职位通常由高级同党人士担任.