Since Korea's transition to democracy in 1987, Korean leaders have become increasingly confrontational toward Japan, with such steps ranging from verbal threats filled with hawkish rhetoric to material threats, such as displays of military force and threats of actually using it. To explain South Korean leaders’ hawkish approach to Japan, we build a theory of “prospective diversion” by combining insights from the diversionary theory of international conflict and prospect theory. We argue that foreign policy leaders have a strong tendency to overvalue political losses relative to comparable gains in their approval ratings. As a result, they are inclined to take risk-seeking diplomatic actions toward foreign adversary to avoid further losses. By conducting statistical analyses and developing case studies of Korean leaders’ confrontational policy decisions regarding Japan, we present empirical findings consistent with our hypothesis that Korean leaders are inclined to engage in prospective diversion toward Japan when they suffer domestic losses. This article provides an enhanced understanding of the domestic political foundation of South Korean leaders’ increasingly contentious attitude toward Japan.

中文翻译：

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韩日关系中的损失厌恶和风险寻求

自 1987 年韩国向民主过渡以来，韩国领导人对日本的对抗性越来越强，从充满鹰派言论的口头威胁到诸如展示武力和威胁实际使用武力等物质威胁，不一而足。为了解释韩国领导人对日本的强硬态度，我们结合了国际冲突转移理论和前景理论的见解，构建了一个“前瞻性转移”理论。我们认为，相对于支持率的可比收益，外交政策领导人倾向于高估政治损失。因此，他们倾向于对外国对手采取冒险的外交行动，以避免进一步的损失。通过对韩国领导人对日本的对抗性政策决定进行统计分析和开展案例研究，我们提出的实证研究结果与我们的假设一致，即韩国领导人在遭受国内损失时倾向于将注意力转向日本。本文加深了对韩国领导人对日本日益争议的态度的国内政治基础的理解。