ABSTRACT Scholars generally view flexibility in international institutions as a trade-off – flexible agreements attract more signatories at the cost of limiting the institution’s ability to change behavior, because flexibility allows states to make shallow commitments that require little, if any, deviation from current behavior. This paper argues that this trade-off is less severe than previous research suggests, because initially shallow commitments can deepen over time as domestic groups mobilize to press governments to widen the scope of their formal commitments. Such mobilization is most likely to arise in democratic societies, where citizens enjoy greater freedom to communicate, express their views, and direct political pressure toward elites. By contrast, in nondemocracies, influxes of information and assistance from international actors catalyze mobilization processes and enhance domestic actors’ ability to exert influence. I find support for this argument in the context of human rights, where states often use reservations to limit the extent to which a treaty requires modification of existing policies. These findings suggest depth can increase over time, allowing flexible treaties to deliver benefits from cooperation that may not have been achieved if the treaty mandated deep commitments from the start.

中文翻译：

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浅薄的承诺可能会影响深远：国内政治和国际合作的灵活性

摘要学者们通常将国际机构的灵活性视为权衡取舍–灵活的协议以限制机构改变行为的能力为代价吸引了更多的签署国，因为灵活性允许国家做出几乎不需要（如果有的话）偏离当前行为的浅薄承诺。 。本文认为，这种权衡并不像以前的研究建议那么严重，因为随着国内组织动员起来敦促政府扩大正式承诺的范围，最初浅薄的承诺会随着时间而加深。这种动员最有可能出现在民主社会中，在民主社会中，公民享有更大的自由交流，表达意见并向精英施加政治压力。相比之下，在非民主国家，来自国际行为者的信息和援助的涌入促进了动员过程，增强了国内行为者施加影响的能力。我发现在人权的背景下支持这一论点，在这种情况下，国家经常使用保留来限制条约要求修改现有政策的程度。这些发现表明，随着时间的推移，深度可能会增加，从而使灵活的条约能够从合作中受益，而如果条约从一开始就要求其做出深远的承诺，则可能无法实现。