ABSTRACT Recent research on multi-actor civil wars highlights that rebel organizations condition their conflict behavior on that of other rebel organizations, with competition and free-riding constituting the core theoretical mechanisms. We provide a new actor-centric approach to explicitly model strategic interdependence in multi-actor civil wars. We argue that rebel organizations have incentives to remain mobilized until the end of a conflict to maintain their power to negotiate, power to spoil, power to enforce, and power to protect. This induces strategic complements that dominate duration dynamics in multi-actor conflicts. Based on a network game-theoretic model, we derive a spatial econometric framework that allows for a direct test of strategic interdependence. We find that the estimated duration interdependence is positive but partially offset in secessionist conflicts where the public goods nature of the incompatibility also induces strategic substitution effects.

中文翻译：

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战略叛军：内战中反叛战斗持续时间的空间计量经济学方法

摘要最近对多主体内战的研究表明，叛乱组织将其冲突行为限制在其他叛乱组织的冲突行为上，而竞争和搭便车则构成了核心的理论机制。我们提供了一种以行为者为中心的新方法，以明确地模拟多参与者内战中的战略相互依存关系。我们认为，叛乱组织有动力动员直到冲突结束，以维持其谈判权，破坏权，执行权和保护权。这引起了战略性补充，这些补充主导了多角色冲突中的持续时间动态。基于网络博弈论模型，我们得出了空间计量经济学框架，该框架可以直接测试战略上的相互依赖性。