ABSTRACT Recent theoretical work has suggested that mutual uncertainty of a particular kind can promote credible reassurance and cooperation among states with compatible preferences. Specifically, on issues where cooperation is subjective, such that states are uncertain what types of actions the other will view as cooperative, credible reassurance under mutual uncertainty is straightforward. This finding, if correct, has profound implications for the scope and severity of the security dilemma, suggesting that misplaced suspicion due to uncertainty can be readily overcome under a range of realistic conditions. We present the results of a laboratory experiment testing this important theoretical claim, and find broad support for it. When cooperation is subjective, mutual uncertainty induces senders to signal their true preferences and allows receivers to form more accurate beliefs about the sender’s type. Importantly, however, mutual uncertainty did not increase receivers’ confidence in their assessments of the sender’s type. Thus, receivers responded appropriately as signals became more credible, but failed to recognize that their beliefs had become more accurate. This distinction between the accuracy and confidence of beliefs has broad implications for international relations theory and social science methodology.

中文翻译：

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相互不确定和可信的保证：实验证据

摘要最近的理论工作表明，一种特殊的相互不确定性可以促进具有相称偏好的国家之间的可信保证和合作。具体而言，在合作是主观的问题上，这样一来，各国就不确定对方在互不肯定的情况下将哪种行动视为合作的，可信的保证就很简单了。如果正确，这一发现对安全困境的范围和严重性具有深远的影响，这表明在一系列现实条件下，可以很容易地克服由于不确定性而引起的错位怀疑。我们提供了测试此重要理论主张的实验室实验结果，并为此寻求了广泛支持。合作是主观的 相互的不确定性促使发送者发出自己的真实偏好，并允许接收者对发送者的类型形成更准确的信念。然而，重要的是，相互的不确定性并没有增加接收者对其发送者类型评估的信心。因此，当信号变得更加可信时，接收者做出了适当的响应，但未能意识到他们的信念已经变得更加准确。信念的准确性和信心之间的这种区别对国际关系理论和社会科学方法论具有广泛的意义。但未能意识到他们的信念变得更加准确。信念的准确性和信心之间的这种区别对国际关系理论和社会科学方法论具有广泛的意义。但未能意识到他们的信念变得更加准确。信念的准确性和信心之间的这种区别对国际关系理论和社会科学方法论具有广泛的意义。