ABSTRACT How do donor governments respond to recipient government violence against civilians? Violence against civilians undermines a common goal of aid: to reduce the risk and impact of instability or civil conflict. We show that donors care about recipient violence against civilians, under certain circumstances. We argue that government use of violence against civilians reduces aid allocations to recipient governments. Competition with other donors, especially rivals, however, will reduce donor sensitivity to government behavior. Testing these expectations on aid from 32 donors to 157 recipients between 1990 and 2013, we find that donors do respond to government violence against civilians but that this effect is conditioned by donor competition. Furthermore, this paper advances foreign aid scholarship by connecting the civil war literature to the strategic provision of aid literature and looking at an understudied form of government behavior in the aid and human rights literature: violence against civilians.

中文翻译：

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对平民的竞争，援助和暴力

摘要捐助国政府如何应对受援国政府针对平民的暴力行为？对平民的暴力破坏了援助的共同目标：减少不稳定或国内冲突的风险和影响。我们表明，在某些情况下，捐助者关心受援国针对平民的暴力行为。我们认为，政府对平民使用暴力会减少对受援国政府的援助分配。但是，与其他捐赠者，尤其是竞争对手的竞争，将降低捐赠者对政府行为的敏感性。在1990年至2013年之间，通过测试32位捐赠者对157位接受者的援助期望，我们发现捐赠者的确对政府针对平民的暴力行为做出了回应，但这种影响取决于捐赠者的竞争。此外，