ABSTRACT An elected Senate and the party-list system are two institutional innovations of the 1997 Thai Constitution designed to support political reforms. This paper sheds light on one unintended effect of these reforms: they have allowed scores of political families to maintain or even tighten their grip on Parliament. Combining aggregate data and case studies, this paper shows that a sizable number of elected senators and party-list parliamentary members are related, by birth or marriage, to other parliament members elected in the post-1932 period. The well-intended reforms have concentrated parliamentary power in the hands of these families, many of which represent the excesses of Thailand’s full-blown electoral democracy. The survival and resilience of these families diminish reform opportunities by further entrenching corruption, clientelism, violence, and electoral fraud, as well as by deepening dynastic rule that militates against political pluralism and inclusiveness.

中文翻译：

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Ironic political reforms: elected senators, party-list MPs, and family rule in Thailand

摘要 选举产生的参议院和政党名单制度是 1997 年泰国宪法旨在支持政治改革的两项制度创新。这篇论文揭示了这些改革的一个意想不到的效果：它们允许数十个政治家族维持甚至加强对议会的控制。Combining aggregate data and case studies, this paper shows that a sizable number of elected senators and party-list parliamentary members are related, by birth or marriage, to other parliament members elected in the post-1932 period. 善意的改革将议会权力集中在这些家庭手中，其中许多代表了泰国全面选举民主的过度行为。这些家庭的生存和复原能力进一步加深了腐败、附庸，减少了改革机会。