In this paper, I raise several concerns for what I call the willing endorsement view of moral responsibility in videogames. Briefly, the willing endorsement view holds that players are appropriate targets of moral judgments when their actions reflect their true, real-world selves. In the first section of the paper, I argue that core features of the willing endorsement view are widely implicitly accepted among philosophers engaging in discussions of morality in games. I then focus on a particularly clear recent version of the view defended by Christopher Bartel. In the second and third sections, I raise several worries for Bartel’s version of the willing endorsement view. In the fourth section, I argue that these worries are not unique to Bartel’s view, but instead result from the view of identity implicit in the willing endorsement view. I conclude by suggesting a path forward by rejecting this view of identity.

中文翻译：

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自由意志，自我和视频游戏动作

在本文中，我对视频游戏中道德责任的自愿支持观点提出了一些担忧。简而言之，愿意的观点认为，当玩家的行为反映出他们真实，真实的自我时，他们就是道德判断的适当对象。在本文的第一部分中，我认为自愿参与观点的核心特征在从事游戏道德讨论的哲学家中被广泛隐含地接受。然后，我将重点介绍克里斯托弗·巴特尔（Christopher Bartel）捍卫的观点的特别清晰的最新版本。在第二部分和第三部分中，我对Bartel愿意支持的观点提出了一些担忧。在第四部分中，我认为这些担忧并非Bartel的观点所独有，而是由自愿认可观点中隐含的身份观点引起的。