Under what circumstances if ever ought we to grant that Artificial Intelligences (AI) are persons? The question of whether AI could have the high degree of moral status that is attributed to human persons has received little attention. What little work there is employs western conceptions of personhood, while non-western approaches are neglected. In this article, I discuss African conceptions of personhood and their implications for the possibility of AI persons. I focus on an African account of personhood that is prima facie inimical to the idea that AI could ever be ‘persons’ in the sense typically attributed to humans. I argue that despite its apparent anthropocentrism, this African account could admit AI as persons.

在什么情况下我们应该承认人工智能（AI）是人？人工智能能否具有人类所具有的高度道德地位的问题很少受到关注。很少有工作采用西方的人格概念，而忽略了非西方的方法。在本文中，我将讨论非洲人的人格概念及其对人工智能人可能性的影响。我关注的是非洲人对人格的描述，从表面上看，这与 AI 可能永远是通常归因于人类的意义上的“人”的想法背道而驰。我认为，尽管其明显的人类中心主义，这个非洲账户可以承认人工智能是人。