Moral agency status is often given to those individuals or entities which act intentionally within a society or environment. In the past, moral agency has primarily been focused on human beings and some higher-order animals. However, with the fast-paced advancements made in artificial intelligence (AI), we are now quickly approaching the point where we need to ask an important question: should we grant moral agency status to AI? To answer this question, we need to determine the moral agency status of these entities in society. In this paper I argue that to grant moral agency status to an entity, deliberate norm-adherence must be possible (at a minimum). In this paper I argue that, under the current status quo, AI systems are unable to meet this criterion. The novel contribution this paper makes to the field of machine ethics is first, to provide at least two criteria with which we can determine moral agency status. We do this by determining the possibility of deliberate norm-adherence through examining the possibility of deliberate norm-violation. Second, to show that establishing moral agency in AI suffer the same pitfalls as establishing moral agency in constitutive accounts of agency.

道德代理地位通常授予那些在社会或环境中有意行事的个人或实体。过去，道德能动性主要集中在人类和一些高等动物身上。然而，随着人工智能 (AI) 的快速进步，我们现在正迅速接近需要提出一个重要问题的地步：我们是否应该授予 AI 道德代理地位? 要回答这个问题，我们需要确定这些实体在社会中的道德代理地位。在这篇论文中，我认为要授予一个实体道德能动性地位，必须有可能（至少）有意识地遵守规范。在本文中，我认为，在目前的现状下，人工智能系统无法满足这一标准。本文对机器伦理领域的新贡献首先是提供了至少两个标准，我们可以通过这些标准来确定道德代理地位。我们通过检查故意违反规范的可能性来确定故意遵守规范的可能性。其次，表明在人工智能中建立道德代理与在代理的构成性帐户中建立道德代理遭受相同的陷阱。