ABSTRACT Unsurprisingly, most of the literature on the origins of the ANZUS alliance examines why the treaty came into existence in 1951, emphasising the role of John Foster Dulles, President Truman’s Special Representative, Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, and Percy Spender, the Australian Foreign Minister. This paper takes a different approach. It focuses on the policy priorities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and argues that the JCS played an important, underappreciated role shaping the text and therefore the nature of the ANZUS treaty. Their coordinated intransigence within the interagency process—described by Acheson as a ‘sustained tantrum’—limited the geographic scope of ANZUS to the Pacific area and prevented Australian policymakers from gaining access to non-Pacific bodies such as NATO. Most importantly, the JCS limited the institutionalised depth of the treaty by preventing the Australian government from gaining access to the Pentagon’s global strategic planning. The policy priorities of the JCS in 1951, and their success at influencing the ANZUS agreement to reflect these priorities, holds enduring significance for the US-Australia alliance, which is simultaneously dominated by the two countries’ militaries yet hampered by underdeveloped mechanisms for policy formulation and institutionalised military cooperation.

中文翻译：

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持续发脾气：参谋长联席会议如何塑造 ANZUS 条约

摘要 不出所料，大多数关于 ANZUS 联盟起源的文献都研究了该条约为何在 1951 年成立，强调了杜鲁门总统的特别代表约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯、国务卿迪恩·艾奇逊和美国国务卿珀西·斯宾德的作用。澳大利亚外交部长。本文采用了不同的方法。它侧重于参谋长联席会议 (JCS) 的政策优先事项，并认为 JCS 在塑造 ANZUS 条约的文本和性质方面发挥了重要的、被低估的作用。他们在机构间进程中协调不妥协——被艾奇逊描述为“持续发脾气”——将 ANZUS 的地理范围限制在太平洋地区，并阻止澳大利亚政策制定者进入北约等非太平洋机构。最重要的是，JCS 通过阻止澳大利亚政府获得五角大楼的全球战略规划来限制条约的制度化深度。1951 年 JCS 的政策优先事项，以及他们成功影响 ANZUS 协议以反映这些优先事项，对美澳联盟具有持久的意义，该联盟同时由两国军队主导，但受到不发达的政策制定机制的阻碍和制度化的军事合作。