ABSTRACT I offer a philosophical examination and feminist queering of the social imaginaries of the dead – with specific reference to recent public disclosures about death in Ireland’s Mother and Baby Homes – by looking at the issue of spectrality through the work of Jacques Derrida and others. What does it mean to respond to the dead, who, though temporarily forgotten, return to haunt us not as remembered human beings but as remnants or remainders? The normative distinctions between past and present; past, present and future; between living and non-living; absence and presence; and self and other are all made indistinct when displaced by a non-linear temporality. What differential is in play with respect to those who are grievable (in Judith Butler’s terms) and the others who constitute what Giorgio Agamben calls bare life? The strategy of memorialising the re/discovered dead seems inadequate, and I outline an alternative hauntological ethics, as suggested by Derrida, and ask if there are queer social imaginaries that allow us to live well with the dead not because we give respect, but because death itself has been rethought. I close with some speculations arising from Deleuzian vitalism and Rosi Braidotti’s optimistic claim that ‘death frees us into life’.

中文翻译：

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质疑死者的社会想象

摘要我通过雅克·德里达和其他人的作品审视幽灵性问题，对死者的社会想象进行了哲学考察和女权主义酷儿——具体参考了爱尔兰母亲和婴儿之家最近公开披露的死亡事件。回应死者意味着什么，他们虽然暂时被遗忘，但不是作为被记住的人，而是作为残余物或残余物回来困扰我们？过去和现在之间的规范性区别；过去、现在和未来；在生物和非生物之间；缺席和存在；当被非线性的时间性取代时，自我和他人都变得模糊不清。对于那些令人悲伤的人（用朱迪思·巴特勒的话说）和其他构成乔治·阿甘本所谓的赤裸生命的人，有什么区别？纪念重新/发现的死者的策略似乎不够充分，我概述了德里达所建议的另一种鬼屋伦理学，并询问是否存在允许我们与死者和睦相处的酷儿社会想象，不是因为我们给予尊重，而是因为死亡本身已经被重新思考。我以德勒兹的生机论和罗西·布雷多蒂 (Rosi Braidotti) 的乐观主张“死亡使我们获得生命”的一些推测作为结尾。而是因为死亡本身已经被重新思考。我以德勒兹的生机论和罗西·布雷多蒂 (Rosi Braidotti) 的乐观主张“死亡使我们获得生命”的一些推测作为结尾。而是因为死亡本身已经被重新思考。我以德勒兹的生机论和罗西·布雷多蒂 (Rosi Braidotti) 的乐观主张“死亡使我们获得生命”的一些推测作为结尾。