ABSTRACT

This article assesses the extent to which incomplete contracts and agreements in waste management limit accountability to stakeholders. The theory of incomplete contracts holds that contracts are under-specified in areas where transaction costs in controlling contingencies exceed the perceived benefits to be derived from such control. A textual analysis of the narrative embodied in public policy documents, the corporate plans of an Australian regional waste management authority and its member councils, and transcripts from interviews with key actors, indicate complex contractual relations resulting from Commonwealth and state waste policies. The study finds transaction costs are the immediate cause of incomplete contracts in the provision of waste data. The resulting agency problem could be alleviated by designing a more complete social contract, through legislation and regulations specifying minimum data requirements in contracts to outsource waste management. Improved regulation would facilitate more effective policing of illegal stockpiling of wastes and reveal the impact of the recently increased waste disposal to landfill on proximate amenities such as property values.

摘要

本文评估了废物管理中不完整的合同和协议在多大程度上限制了对利益相关者的责任。不完全合同的理论认为，在控制突发事件的交易成本超过了从这种控制中获得的预期收益的领域中，合同的规格不足。对公共政策文件，澳大利亚区域废物管理当局及其成员委员会的公司计划以及与主要行为者访谈的笔录的文字描述进行的文字分析表明，英联邦和州废物政策导致了复杂的合同关系。研究发现交易成本是提供废物数据中合同不完整的直接原因。通过设计更完整的社会契约，可以减轻由此产生的代理问题，通过法律法规规定合同中的最低数据要求，以将废物管理外包。改进后的法规将有助于更有效地监管非法储存废物，并揭示最近增加的将废物处置至垃圾填埋场对附近便利设施（如财产价值）的影响。