ABSTRACT

The 1997 Indo–Naga ceasefire is one of the world’s longest truces. Although formally-agreed rules technically regulate the state-rebel relationship, the rules themselves and their applicability beyond the Indian state of Nagaland are ambiguous and open to interpretation. Far from static, the ceasefire represents an evolving cluster of ‘armed orders’ oscillating between coexistence and limited conflict [Staniland, Paul. “Armed Politics and the Study of Intrastate Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 4 (July 1, 2017): 459–67. doi:10.1177/0022343317698848]. Indian state actors display intriguing variations in their approaches towards these orders, from restraint and de-escalation in some circumstances to aggressive local counterinsurgency in others. To date, however, existing research on order within ceasefires focus on rebel perspectives. Building on existing efforts to reconceptualise ceasefires as arenas in which political order is negotiated and constructed, this article re-introduces the state’s role in order-making, locating these processes within wider rebel and non-state attempts to do so. Analysing armed orders in the Naga ceasefire, it reveals a fascinating spectrum of bargaining, signalling and negotiation over the formal and informal rules of armed orders. This challenges the notion that ceasefires simply lock in state-armed group orders, but instead create new spaces for armed order’s renegotiation.

摘要

1997 年的印那加停火是世界上最长的停火协议之一。尽管正式商定的规则在技术上规范了国家与反叛者的关系，但规则本身及其在印度那加兰邦以外的适用性是模棱两可的，可以进行解释。停火远非一成不变，而是代表着在共存和有限冲突之间摇摆不定的不断发展的“武装秩序”集群 [Staniland, Paul. “武装政治和国家内部冲突研究” ，和平研究杂志54，没有。4（2017 年 7 月 1 日）：459-67。doi:10.1177/0022343317698848]。印度国家行为者在对待这些命令的方式上表现出有趣的变化，从某些情况下的克制和降级到其他情况下的激进的当地反叛乱。然而，迄今为止，关于停火内秩序的现有研究集中在反叛者的观点上。在现有努力将停火重新定义为谈判和构建政治秩序的舞台的基础上，本文重新介绍了国家在制定秩序中的作用，将这些过程置于更广泛的反叛和非国家尝试中。分析纳迦停火中的武装命令，它揭示了关于武装命令的正式和非正式规则的讨价还价、信号和谈判的迷人范围。