ABSTRACT

The peacekeeping literature has primarily documented correlations between peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and their effectiveness or has focused on the decisions of troop-contributing countries participating in PKOs. Unlike the extant research, this paper shifts the focus to the decision-making process within PKOs. More specifically, this paper focuses on the timing of peacekeeper deployment by investigating how contributor leaders are distinguished from contributor followers. To tackle this topic, I use deployment-map data from 13 UN PKOs in Africa from 1990 to 2016. When a leader country deploys to a region before other countries, the followers will thus face an incentive to free ride because waiting to deploy to the region until it is secure is less risky. In short, there is a second-mover advantage that induces other countries to delay deployment until much later in a given UN PKO’s designated deployment window. This study finds that countries that could deploy more troops at their initial time of deployment and that have many previous UN PKO experiences are more likely to be leaders. Results also suggest that contributors engaging in multiple UN PKOs contemporaneously are less likely to be leaders.

抽象的

维持和平文献主要记录了维持和平行动（PKO）与其有效性之间的相关性，或者侧重于参加维持和平行动的部队派遣国的决定。不同于现存的研究，本文将焦点移到决策过程中PKO。更具体地说，本文通过调查捐助方领导人与捐助方追随者的区别，着重于维和人员的部署时间。为了解决这个问题，我使用了1990年至2016年非洲13个联合国维和行动组织的部署地图数据。当一个领先国家在其他国家之前部署到某个区域时，追随者将因此面临搭便车的动机，因为等待部署到直到安全为止，该区域的风险较小。简而言之，存在先发优势，诱使其他国家将部署推迟到很久之后才在给定的联合国维和部指定的部署窗口中进行。这项研究发现，那些在最初部署时可以部署更多部队并且拥有许多联合国维和行动经验的国家更有可能成为领导者。