ABSTRACT

Mediators improve the chances disputants in civil wars sign a peace agreement by exerting pressure or influence, referred to as leverage. This paper explores how sources of mediator leverage complement one another and draws attention to an under-explored form of influence: credible staying power. I argue that softer forms of leverage (i.e. relationships with the disputants and credible staying power) complement material strength, providing the highest chance of reaching a peace agreement when used together. As multiple sources of leverage mean multiple mediators, this paper also explores the number of and coordination among mediators, acknowledging the tension between multiple mediators increasing available leverage while complicating negotiations by adding more voices to the negotiating table. I argue that more mediators, all else equal, will decrease the probability of success; this effect can be offset, however, by coordination among the mediators. Empirical analysis of 312 mediation efforts in civil wars from 1989 to 2006 find that softer forms of leverage do reinforce material power, producing the greatest probability of reaching a signed agreement when used together. Moreover, coordination substantially mitigates the negative effect of additional mediators.

摘要

调解员通过施加压力或影响来提高内战中争端者签署和平协议的机会，称为杠杆。本文探讨了调解人的杠杆作用源如何相互补充，并提请人们注意一种尚未探索的影响形式：可靠的持久力。我认为，较软的杠杆形式（即与争端者的关系和可靠的持久力）可以补充物质力量，当一起使用时，提供达成和平协议的最大机会。由于杠杆的多种来源意味着多个调解人，因此本文还探讨了调解人的数量和协调，并认识到多个调解人之间的紧张关系增加了可利用的杠杆作用，同时通过在谈判桌上增加更多的声音而使谈判复杂化。我认为，在其他条件相同的情况下，更多的调解人会降低成功的可能性；但是，可以通过调解员之间的协调来抵消这种影响。对1989年至2006年内战中312次调解工作的经验分析发现，较软的杠杆形式确实增强了物质力量，当一起使用时，达成签署协议的可能性最大。此外，协调可以大大减轻其他调解人的负面影响。